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We have a much better understanding of physics than we do of 
consciousness. I consider ways in which intrinsically mental aspects of 
fundamental ontology might induce modifications of the known laws of 
physics, or whether they could be relevant to accounting for consciousness 
if no such modifications exist. I suggest that our current knowledge of 
physics should make us skeptical of hypothetical modifications of the 
known rules, and that without such modifications it’s hard to imagine how 
intrinsically mental aspects could play a useful explanatory role. 
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We don’t fully understand consciousness. That’s hardly surprising. The human brain, 
which is at least somewhat involved in consciousness, contains roughly 100 billion 
neurons and 700 trillion synaptic connections. It is arguably the most complex structure 
in the known universe. Even as neuroscience makes impressive advances in 
understanding the brain, it seems prudent to anticipate that we have a number of 
conceptual and technical breakthroughs yet to come that could bear in important ways 
on the question of consciousness. 
 
We do, on the other hand, understand the basic laws of physics governing the stuff of 
which brains are made. They take the form of an effective quantum field theory 
describing a particular collection of matter particles interacting via force fields. There is 
certainly much of physics remaining to be discovered, but in the specific regime covering 
the particles and forces that make up human beings and their environments, we have 
good reason to think that all of the ingredients and their dynamics are understood to 
extremely high precision (Carroll 2021a). Modern physics, in other words, provides 
evidence for what philosophers call “causal closure of the physical”: physical events have 
purely physical causes (Loewer 1995, Papineau 1995), at least in the regime relevant to 
human life. Without dramatically upending our understanding of quantum field theory, 
there is no room for any new influences that could bear on the problem of consciousness.  
 
Given this situation, it might seem surprising to a disinterested observer to learn that 
anyone would argue that the best route toward understanding consciousness involves 
augmenting or altering the ontology suggested by fundamental physics. To start with the 
least-well-understood aspects of reality and draw sweeping conclusions about the best-
understood aspects is arguably the tail wagging the dog. When we can’t remember where 
we put our car keys, we don’t typically respond by going out and buying a new car. 
 
Nevertheless, a prominent strain in the philosophy of consciousness proposes to do just 
that (Chalmers 1996, Goff 2017, 2019). The justification for such a radical move is that 
there will be something qualitatively missing in any account of consciousness based purely 
on physical ontology as we currently understand it. This perspective arises from a 
conviction that physics can explain behavior, but not the first-person experiences 
characteristic of human consciousness; that physics may account for the dynamics of the 
stuff in the universe, but it doesn’t illuminate the intrinsic nature of that stuff. 
 
In this paper I support the idea that physics is in such good shape that the most promising 
strategy for trying to understand consciousness is as a (weakly) emergent phenomenon 
that leaves physical ontology untouched, rather than trying to extend or elaborate that 
ontology with specifically mental aspects (cf. Moran 2021; for a contrary view see Smolin 
and Verde 2021). After reviewing the Core Theory and our reasons for being confident in 
its accuracy, I will discuss what it would mean to modify it, either directly in the 
dynamics or by adding additional ontological features. I further argue that any approach 
in which mental aspects leave physical behavior unchanged are self-undermining and 
fall short of accounting for consciousness. It is always possible that contemporary physics 
is inadequate and in need of modification, but a close examination highlights the 
difficulty of doing so in a rigorous and convincing way. 
 
The Physics Underlying Everyday Life 
 
The history of physics is rife with premature claims that we are close to understanding 
everything. These unfortunate episodes should not lead us to forget that we do 
understand some things.  
 
Science often employs multiple vocabularies or theories for describing the same physical 
situation, often at different degrees of focus or coarse-graining. These are often called 
“levels,” although strictly speaking they need not be arranged hierarchically. Within any 
level, we can specify the domain of circumstances in which a particular theory is 
applicable. The claim here is that there is one level of description – that of effective 
quantum field theory – and a well-defined regime – interaction energies below certain 
thresholds, broad enough to include every situation encountered in ordinary human life 
– where we have very good reasons to believe we know precisely what is going on. 
 
A quantum field theory is, unsurprisingly, a quantum theory of fields. The fundamental 
ontology of any quantum theory is specified by a “quantum state” or “wave function,” 
expressed mathematically as a vector in an abstract Hilbert space (Carroll 2021b). In a 
quantum field theory, that state can be thought of as being constructed from possible 
configurations of fields that take on values at each point in spacetime.  
 
Fortunately, the details of this formalism are not necessary for our present purposes. 
Once we quantize the fields, appropriate configurations – essentially, low-lying energy 
states – can be interpreted as collections of interacting particles. These circumstances are 
more than broad enough to encompass human beings and their environments. Thus, we 
can think of people and the objects around them as configurations of certain particles. In 
particular, human beings are made of atoms; those atoms are made of protons, neutrons, 
and electrons; the protons and neutrons are made of quarks and gluons. These particles 
interact through gravitation, electromagnetism, and the nuclear forces, and get mass from 
a background Higgs field.  
 
The dynamics of these particles and forces are governed by an effective quantum field 
theory known as the “Core Theory,” consisting of both the Standard Model of particle 
physics and the weak-field limit of general relativity (Wilczek 2015). This theory is not 
the ultimate theory of everything, nor is it intended to be. The world might not be 
described by a quantum field theory at the deepest level; that description might emerge 
from a more fundamental set of degrees of freedom and dynamical laws. And the Core 
Theory is certainly not supposed to cover every circumstance – dark matter and the Big 
Bang, to name some obvious examples, are not included. But we have excellent reasons 
to believe that the entirety of the “everyday life regime” supervenes on the ontology and 
dynamics of this theory (Carroll 2021a). If there is a more fundamental level, its properties 
are irrelevant to the autonomous dynamics of the Core Theory. And if there are 
additional particles and forces, they interact too weakly with the known fields to exert 
any influence on human behavior; otherwise they would have already been detected in 
experiments.  
 
Our confidence in this picture derives from the fact that quantum field theories are the 
practically unique way to satisfy the general principles of quantum mechanics and 
relativity; from symmetries ensuring that any unobserved fields must be too weakly-
interacting with ordinary matter to be relevant for everyday-life dynamics; and the 
property of effective field theories that the dynamics themselves are fully determined in 
terms of a very small number of parameters. We can’t know for certain that the Core 
Theory suffices to correctly describe the behavior of the particles and fields making up 
human beings, no matter how good our arguments become, but any proposed 
modification of this theory should be held to a very high standard indeed. Just as with 
any hypothetical new physical model, it should be quantitative and precise, detailing 
exactly how the explicit dynamics of the Core Theory are meant to be modified, and how 
such modifications are consistent (or not) with features such as unitarity, locality, 
symmetries, and conservation laws, not to mention experiments. 
 
Domains of Applicability 
 
In the context of the relationship between consciousness and the laws of physics, it is 
worth being a bit more explicit about how we specify the “domain of applicability” of a 
theory (Carroll 2016). The general idea is that there is a set of physical situations in which 
the predictions of the theory are meant to be accurate, with no claims being made for 
situations outside that set. Newton’s theory of gravity does not correctly describe the 
emission of gravitational waves by orbiting black holes, but is perfectly adequate for 
sending a rocket to the Moon. In this case the relevant domain of applicability consists of 
situations when the gravitational field is weak and all relevant objects are moving slowly 
compared to the speed of light. In other circumstances, the Newtonian limit doesn’t 
apply, and we must use Einstein’s theory of general relativity. 
 
The empirical foundation of the Core Theory has been established through a line of 
experimental and observational results stretching back to Faraday, Rutherford, and many 
others. But the most precise constraints come from modern-day particle colliders, which 
typically measure the results of scattering individual particles off of each other. One 
might sensibly wonder whether results from such a paradigmatically reductionist setting 
can be straightforwardly extrapolated to something as complex as a human brain, which 
contains roughly 1027 particles. Perhaps brains are just not within the domain of 
applicability of the Core Theory. 
 
If we accept the basic framework of effective quantum field theory, this concern is 
unfounded; everything that happens inside biological organisms here on Earth is 
unambiguously within the purview of the Core Theory. Its domain of applicability is 
bounded by two criteria. The first is that gravity must be weak, so that we can treat the 
gravitational field as an ordinary quantum field, sidestepping subtleties of horizons and 
Hawking radiation. “Weak” is a relative term, and in this case means “the gravitational 
potential is much smaller than one.” In practice, this means “we are nowhere near a black 
hole.” This criterion is easily met by everything we know of in the Solar System, human 
brains included. 
 
The other criterion comes from effective field theory. The modifier “effective” indicates 
that the domain of applicability of the theory is specified in terms of energies – in 
particular, the amount of energy transferred between particles when they interact. An 
effective field theory is meant to be accurate when energy transfers remain lower than 
some explicit cutoff. In the case of the Core Theory, experiments have established its 
accuracy at energy transfers of up to 1011 electron volts. Electro-chemical reactions inside 
biological organisms, meanwhile, happen at less than 102 eV. Shrinking the domain of 
applicability of the Core Theory while remaining within the framework of effective 
quantum field theory requires a mistake in our current understanding by a factor of over 
a billion, which seems implausible. 
 
The effective field theory paradigm also features very specific properties of the field 
dynamics: they are local (interacting only with other fields at the same spacetime point), 
and governed by a simple and inflexible set of equations. (In the technical jargon, by 
“relevant” and “marginal” operators, with other “irrelevant” operators living up to their 
name.) So below, when I refer to “within the effective-field-theory paradigm,” this is what 
is meant: a theory of quantum fields, evolving under the appropriate simple dynamical 
equations, applicable in circumstances where gravity is weak and interactions feature 
energy transfers below the cutoff. 
 
Within its domain of applicability, the Core Theory is what we might label causally 
comprehensive. If we give a complete specification of the quantum state of the Core Theory 
fields within that regime, there is a specific equation that unambiguously predicts how it 
will evolve over time. This equation is sufficient to describe everything human beings 
generally do, unless they jump into a black hole or stick their hand inside the beam of a 
high-energy particle accelerator. There are no ambiguities or loose ends. The fact that 
brains are big, complex things is irrelevant. The Core Theory makes specific predictions 
for how any particular brain will behave; our choice is to either accept that prediction, or 
modify the theory in some way. There is no third alternative (Aristotle 2002). 
 
Ontology and Dynamics 
 
Despite the extraordinary empirical success of the Core Theory, and the fact that human 
beings and their brains are made out of particles interacting within its domain of 
applicability, there is a lingering worry that no physicalist picture is up to the task of 
accounting for consciousness, even as some higher-level weakly-emergent phenomenon. 
There are various ways of expressing this concern: conscious experiences are inherently 
first-person and subjective; merely physical objects cannot feel what it is to be like 
something; describing the behavior and functions of objects does not explain their 
intrinsic nature; and others. See Goff (2019) for an overview. 
 
One common reaction to these concerns is to contemplate modifications of the underlying 
ontology suggested by modern physics: to suggest that a quantum state built upon 
interacting fields obeying strict equations of motion is incapable in principle of 
accounting for consciousness, and that we instead need to add specifically mental aspects 
to our description of reality. We may contemplate ontological modifications as dramatic 
as substance dualism, in which an immaterial mind is distinct from the physical body but 
interacts with it, or idealism, in which the physical world is a kind of projection of a 
fundamentally mental reality. In this paper I will focus on more subtle approaches, in 
which mental aspects or properties are related to, but augment, the basic physical reality. 
Approaches under this umbrella include property dualism, which posits distinct mental 
properties in addition to physical properties (Chalmers 2003b); Russellian monism, 
which posits both physical and mental aspects belonging to a single underlying set of 
properties (Russell 1927, Chalmers 1996, Strawson 2006, Goff 2017); and other forms of 
panpsychism, epiphenomenalism and related approaches (Papineau 2020). For 
convenience I will refer to any new ontological features as “mental aspects,” which is 
meant to include potentially autonomous properties as well as intrinsic qualities that 
might supervene on the physical situation. 
 
Any such approach must specify whether, and how, it modifies the dynamics of the 
theory as well as the ontology. In our conventional understanding, consciousness exerts 
an important influence on behavior: I can have a conscious experience and talk about it. 
(Admittedly, highly trained philosophers are reported to be able to imagine removing 
consciousness from a being without affecting its behavior in any way.) Observed human 
behavior can be traced to electrical and chemical signals in our brains and nervous 
systems. Explicitly mental aspects of ontology could affect this behavior by, for example, 
influencing the rates of chemical reactions, or the strength of electromagnetic forces, or 
the probability of certain quantum outcomes. For this paper we are imagining that such 
effects do not arise from simply pushing around the fields (as in substance dualism), but 
from potentially altering the properties of the fields themselves. 
 
In what follows we will examine different kinds of relationship that a theory of 
consciousness might have to the physical dynamics of the Core Theory, as well as the 
possibility that there is no relationship at all. Our goal is not to comprehensively 
catalogue the possibilities, but just to highlight some of the challenges faced by any 
approach that aspires to explain consciousness by adding mental aspects to the 
fundamental ontology of the world. 
 
Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics 
 
Quantum field theory is a subset of quantum mechanics. Like any quantum theory (and 
in contrast with classical theories), the dynamics of the Core Theory come in two parts. 
There is a law of evolution that describes how an undisturbed quantum state evolves 
deterministically over time, referred to as the unitary dynamics. The law can be cast as a 
version of the Schrödinger equation or in a number of equivalent formulations. The other 
part takes the form of a probabilistic algorithm expressing how the wave function 
responds to being measured. Operationally, a measured wave function “collapses” onto 
a state with a definite value of the quantity being measured, so we label this the collapse 
dynamics. Collapse introduces a stochastic element, with the probability of different 
outcomes being related to the original wave function by the Born Rule. There are 
therefore two broad strategies one could contemplate for modifying the dynamics of the 
Core Theory: altering its unitary dynamics, or its collapse dynamics.  
 
The questions of what precisely constitutes a quantum measurement, what happens 
when one is performed, and what is the correct ontology describing quantum systems, 
have remained controversial. Contrary to some claims in the popular literature, however, 
the quantum measurement problem does not by itself provide evidence against 
physicalism. There are perfectly physical models that account for quantum phenomena 
without introducing any specifically mental aspects or preferred roles for observers, 
including Many-Worlds, pilot-wave theories, and objective-collapse models. Other 
models do put “agents” front and center, casting the quantum wave function as a 
representation of the agent’s knowledge of a system, while still remaining resolutely 
physicalist. We don’t need to distinguish between these competing theories for our 
present purposes; see overviews by Norsen (2017) and Maudlin (2019), and cf. Rovelli 
(2021). 
 
According to textbook quantum mechanics, when one measures a quantum observable 
such as position or momentum or spin, only certain specified outcomes (“eigenvalues”) 
can be obtained. To each possible outcome, the quantum state assigns a complex number, 
the amplitude. The Born Rule states that the probability of obtaining that outcome is the 
modulus-squared of the corresponding amplitude. Importantly, there is no hidden 
structure within this rule; once we know the amplitudes, experimental outcomes are truly 
randomly chosen from the appropriate probability distribution. 
 
The Born Rule has thus far passed experimental tests (Lin et al. 2017), but the fact that 
both consciousness and quantum measurement remain mysterious makes it tempting to 
imagine that there is a connection. What we are interested in here is not the prospect that 
consciousness causes wave function collapse (Wigner 1961; Stapp 2001; Chalmers and 
McQueen 2014), but that somehow wave functions collapse in just the right way to 
account for consciousness. Penrose and Hameroff have developed an approach in which 
wave functions collapse when certain physical criteria are met, which they argue can 
explain aspects of human cognition (Penrose 1989, Penrose and Hameroff 2011, Penrose 
2014). However, although this program is often described as an approach to 
“consciousness,” it does not attempt to answer the qualitative questions of first-person 
experience any differently than any other purely physical account. Similarly, quantum 
entanglement may play a role in cognition (Fischer 2015), but this is a matter of 
information processing, without any special connection to qualitative experience. 
 
If one were interested in allowing mental aspects to affect the probability of quantum 
measurement outcomes, presumably that could be done. The Born Rule states that the 
probability of obtaining an outcome a is given by p(a) = |ya|2, where ya is the component 
of the wave function corresponding to that outcome. We could imagine a new rule 
 
p(a) = f(ya, Ma),        (1) 
 
where Ma represents some novel mental aspect of the situation. This modified Born Rule 
might affect the rate of certain chemical reactions inside a human brain, thereby allowing 
mental aspects of consciousness to influence our physical behavior, without showing up 
in experiments performed with non-conscious equipment.  
 
Of course, such a rule for wave-function collapse represents a wild modification of 
conventional physics, not merely a loophole within it. A respectable theory along these 
lines would include a specification of what the mental aspects Ma are, an understanding 
of their independent dynamics, and an explicit form of the new rule (1). All of these are 
possible to contemplate, but they remind us of the high standards to which any modified 
laws of fundamental physics should be held. 
 
Furthermore, if one were convinced that purely physical ontologies are incapable in 
principle of accounting for the qualitative features of consciousness, the process of wave 
function collapse does not offer any unique opportunities. Regardless of when and how 
wave functions collapse, at the end of the day they are still wave functions. One could 
conceivably take a dualist approach, positing that a separate mental realm interacted with 
ordinary matter by triggering (or delaying) collapse. In that case, wave function collapse 
would play the role of a modern version of Descartes’s pineal gland, mediating the 
interaction of mental and physical realms. If instead we think in terms of novel mental 
properties affecting chemical reaction rates, there would be no relevant difference 
between modifying the collapse dynamics and the unitary dynamics.  
 
Consciousness and Quantum Field Theory 
 
We turn next to the unitary dynamics. As discussed above, if we stay entirely within the 
effective-field-theory paradigm, both for the Core Theory fields and potentially new 
dynamical elements, there is no room for modifying the dynamics in ways that would be 
relevant for human behavior while remaining compatible with experimental constraints. 
Any new fields that would be relevant for what goes on in the human brain would have 
been discovered long ago. 
 
We can nevertheless imagine that new mental aspects influence the quantum fields of the 
Core Theory, without themselves obeying the rules of quantum field theory. To see how 
that might work, it is useful to look at one part of the Core Theory: quantum 
electrodynamics, the theory of charged particles (including electrons, protons, and even 
atomic nuclei) with electromagnetic fields. To the extent that gravity, nuclear reactions, 
and radioactive decays can be ignored (all of which are presumably irrelevant for 
questions of consciousness), this is enough to include all of the physics relevant for 
human biology. The unitary dynamics can be summarized in a one-line equation: 
 
      (2) 
 
We don’t need to dive into this equation in detail, but a few points are worth highlighting. 
The expression tells us how a quantum state (describing, for example, a human brain) 
consisting of charged particles yn and electromagnetic fields Fµn evolves from a given 
initial state to a final one. It is entirely deterministic and causally comprehensive; 
indeterminism only comes from the non-unitary collapse dynamics. The expression in 
square brackets is the Lagrangian, which encodes the properties of different kinds of 
particles. The notation ∫𝑑! 𝑥 indicates that the Lagrangian is integrated over spacetime. 




















(and with themselves) at the same point in spacetime. We multiply the integral of the 
Lagrange density by 𝑖 = √−1, exponentiate it, and integrate the result over all possible 
configurations of the fields to obtain the transition amplitude. The notation k<L indicates 
that this is meant to be an effective theory, applicable below the cutoff energy L. See 
(Carroll 2016) for further elaboration. Any given approach to consciousness will either 
modify this equation, or it won’t. 
 
The properties specified by the Lagrangian include the masses of the particles mn, as well 
as the parameters characterizing their interactions, such as electric charges qn. The 
strength and rate of electrochemical processes, including those in human brains and 
bodies, are calculable in terms of these parameters.  
 
An obvious way that mental aspects could modify physical dynamics is for them to affect 
the values of these parameters, which would in turn affect the rate of processes in the 
brain. Given some physical/mental situation S, we could imagine context-dependent 
changes in the values of the physical constants that govern Core Theory dynamics, of the 
form 
 
        (3) 
 
If S included mental aspects of our ontology, this would be a mechanism by which those 
aspects could affect human behavior, such as our testimony concerning our introspective 
experiences. 
 
As in the case of the Born Rule, we are welcome to contemplate mentally-induced 
modifications of particle-physics parameters, but a number of questions present 
themselves. What precisely is meant by the situation S, and what kind of dynamics does 
it have? Naively, changes in the masses or charges of particles would lead directly to 
violations of conservation of energy and momentum. Are these compensated by transfers 
of energy between conventional matter and a “mental sector”? These questions are 
potentially answerable, but they highlight the challenges faced by any proposed theory 
of this form. 
 
Mental Degrees of Freedom 
 
Panpsychists sometimes analogize consciousness to electric charge, as a property that 
inheres in appropriate fundamental particles. There are at least two severe limitations to 
this analogy. First, electric charge is a paradigmatic example of a property with 
dynamical consequences; placed in an electric field, particles with opposite charges move 
in opposite directions. In the case where we imagine that the properties associated with 
consciousness have no dynamical consequences, it is not clear what the analogy is 
supposed to illuminate. Second, charge is conserved. An elementary particle has a single, 
unchanging value of charge throughout its existence, whereas it is generally supposed 
that conscious states can take on different values. 
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We should therefore distinguish between two alternatives: that hypothetical new mental 
aspects of our ontology supervene on the physical situation, or that there are independent 
“mental degrees of freedom” that are not determined by the physical situation. In 
panpsychist terms, these correspond to the possibility that any particular electron has a 
definite value of consciousness, versus the idea that any given electron might have 
multiple conscious states (perhaps even a continuum thereof).  
 
If the new mental aspects of our ontology supervene on the physical aspects, as far as 
physical behavior is concerned this is indistinguishable from not introducing mental 
states at all. Consider some causal chain Pi ® Mi ® Bi, where Pi is some physical state, Mi 
is some mental state, Bi is some behavior, and “®” stands for “inevitably leads to.” If we 
think of mental aspects as primary, but nevertheless supervening on the physical 
situation, we could write Mi(Pi) ® Bi. Either case is functionally equivalent to the shorter 
chain Pi ® Bi. (This is analogous to “integrating out” heavy or non-dynamical degrees of 
freedom in quantum field theory.) For all intents and purposes this is equivalent to 
positing that mental aspects have no effect on physical behavior, a possibility we will 
consider later in the paper. 
 
Turn instead to the alternative where the same physical configuration might be associated 
with different mental degrees of freedom. These aspects would be roughly analogous to 
the spin of an electron, which is some combination of “spin-up” and “spin-down” for any 
given particle, but can be specified independently of the particle’s position. 
 
The idea of new independent mental degrees of freedom runs into serious trouble with 
the framework of quantum field theory. In conventional field theory, the existence of new 
degrees of freedom quantitatively affects processes that rely on quantum fluctuations, in 
which each property value represents a separate contribution that should be added 
together (e.g. we “sum over spins” in a scattering calculation). But we know empirically 
how many degrees of freedom actual electrons have – two spin states for the electron, 
and another two for its antiparticle, the positron. If electrons could also be found in both 
“happy” and “sad” states, it would have an unmistakable impact on their scattering rates, 
in flagrant contradiction with experiment.  
 
Our allowed alternatives are to posit that all electrons have the same conscious state – let 
us be generous and imagine they are all happy – in which case there is effectively no 
dynamical impact, or that mental degrees of freedom are somehow not like physical ones. 
In the latter case, we are left with the question of what mental degrees of freedom are like, 
if they are not like physical ones. We can avoid conflict with what we know, but only at 




One approach to the relationship between consciousness and physics is to appeal to 
strong emergence – the idea that legitimately new behaviors arise in collective phenomena 
that cannot be derived in terms of the individual behaviors of constituent parts of the 
system. Strong emergence is sometimes invoked as a way to allow for specifically mental 
causal powers (O’Connor and Wong 2005). It is worth spending a moment on the 
relationship between strong emergence and the underlying framework of effective 
quantum field theory – namely, they are entirely incompatible. 
 
As discussed above, the Core Theory provides a comprehensive specification of the 
quantum-field dynamics within its domain of applicability, which includes any processes 
between known particles with energy transfers less than a hundred billion electron volts. 
The field equations are precisely local: the unitary dynamics of each field at any one 
spacetime point are influenced only on the values and derivatives of the other fields at 
the same point, and not directly by what is happening elsewhere. Electrons and other 
particles obey the same equations whether they are inside a rock or inside a human brain. 
 
The strong emergentist must therefore deviate from the paradigm of effective field theory 
entirely, while maintaining the empirical successes of the Core Theory. The most direct 
way to do this would be to postulate a new restriction on the domain of applicability that 
is not given in terms of energy transfers in particle interactions, but on some explicitly 
macroscopic criterion. For example, one could hypothesize that quantum field theory 
breaks down when the number of particle excitations in a region surpasses a certain 
number, or (probably more relevant to consciousness) when the configuration of such 
particles reaches a certain quantifiable degree of complexity or information-processing 
capacity. The effective masses and couplings of elementary particles might, for example, 
be modified as in (3), where the situation S could involve a quantitative measure of 
consciousness from an approach such as Integrated Information Theory (Tononi et al. 
2016). 
 
One is, of course, free to contemplate whatever extravagant deviations from 
contemporary physics as one likes. Particle-physics experiments typically examine the 
interactions of just a few particles at a time, so new physical laws that only kick in for 
complex agglomerations of particles are not necessarily ruled out by data we currently 
have. It’s worth noting, however, how profound a departure such laws would represent. 
The most fundamental principle of quantum field theory is locality: fields at any one 
point in spacetime are only influenced by the values and derivatives of other fields at that 
same point, not the behavior of fields at other points. Modifying the dynamical equations 
in ways that were sensitive to the complexity of a configuration of surrounding particles 
would represent a dramatic overthrow of this principle.  
 
Moreover, based on purely physical grounds rather than consciousness-based 
motivations, our expectation that the laws of quantum field theory might break down in 
biological organisms would be very low indeed. To we macroscopic people, the 1027 
particles in a human brain seems like a lot, certainly far greater than the number 
physicists typically collide in high-energy accelerators. But the density of those particles 
is very low by particle-physics standards. To be conservative, we might take as a standard 
length scale the Compton wavelength of the electron, le = 2x10-10 cm. The volume of a 
human brain is 1,260 cubic centimeters, or about 1032 cubic Compton wavelengths. The 
number of particles is therefore less than 10-5 per standard volume. (It would be 
enormously smaller had we used the Compton wavelength of the proton or neutron, not 
to mention the Planck length.) From the point of view of particle physics, a brain is not a 
densely packed system; indeed, it’s practically empty space. There is no physical rationale 
for expecting the dynamics of the Core Theory to break down in such an environment, 
regardless of how complex the overall situation is. For any particular electron or nucleus, 
almost all of the rest of the brain is so far away as to be essentially irrelevant. 
 
This is not to say that the concept of strong emergence, and the related phenomenon of 
“downward causation,” might not be relevant in other contexts, where the “micro” 
theory is something other than elementary particles. If a complex system consists of a 
collection of smaller systems that are themselves complex, a purely local theory might 
not suffice, and the best description of the overall dynamics could conceivably involve 
microphysical dynamics that depend on macrophysical contexts in interesting ways 
(Flack 2017). In the phenomenon of “quorum sensing,” for example, gene expression in 
bacteria is affected by their overall population density (Miller and Bassler 2001). In such 
cases, the subsystems themselves are extended objects with nontrivial internal dynamics, 
which can effectively measure and record information about their environment. Because 
of that feature, the criterion of locality is significantly less severe.  
 
Quantum field theory is a very different situation, where subsystems (elementary 
particles) have no internal structure. In that case, the locality of interactions is exact; what 
matters to the dynamics of a field at each point is only the other fields at that same point, 
not anything elsewhere. Any new context-dependent behavior departing from the 
predictions of (2) would be a violation of our expectations from effective quantum field 
theory, not a supplement to them.  
 
Passive Mentalism and Zombies 
 
We finally turn to the possibility that there exist purely mental aspects of the basic 
ontology of the world that have no effect at all on physical dynamics. We can label this 
alternative “passive mentalism.” 
 
Passive mentalism opens the door to contemplating the possibility of philosophical 
zombies: creatures that have exactly the same physical behavior as ordinary human 
beings, but lack any inner conscious experiences (Campbell 1970, Chalmers 1996, Kirk 
2005). In particular, we can imagine two kinds of possible worlds, both of which exactly 
obey the dynamics of the Core Theory: one of which is a purely physical one without any 
additional aspects, and the other of which includes those features that make true 
conscious experience possible. 
 
It is tempting to think of zombies as a kind of automata, going through life without feeling 
or affect. Maybe they would come across as generally a little deadpan or at least even-
keeled. But that would be wrong; by hypothesis, zombies behave exactly like conscious 
human beings. They laugh, cry, lament when their hearts are broken, and cheer when 
their team wins. If we take ourselves to live in the possible world that does include 
conscious experiences, there is a zombie possible world with exactly the same set of 
people have exactly the same discussions and interactions. It contains a zombie Philip 
Goff who wrote precisely the text of Galileo’s Error, and a zombie Sean Carroll who wrote 
precisely this article; those poor souls (as it were) just don’t really possess any conscious 
experiences, despite what they may say about the matter when they are asked. In zombie 
world, there are plenty of people who sincerely testify that they are experiencing the 
redness of red, but those utterances have absolutely no connection with an actual 
experience of redness. 
 
The zombie thought experiment is sometimes developed into an argument against 
physicalism, which goes something like this: 
 
• Zombies are conceivable. 
• Conceivability implies possibility. 
• If zombies are possible, consciousness is not physical. 
• Therefore, consciousness is not physical. 
 
The idea behind the third premise is that the conceivability of zombies implies that 
whatever consciousness is, if we can in principle imagine the same physical situation with 
or without conscious experiences, consciousness can’t be reducible to physical behaviors. 
It’s a valid argument, which has engendered a great deal of discussion about the nature 
of conceivability and its relation to possibility (Chalmers 2002), which I won’t delve into 
here. 
 
One might reasonably suggest that any construal of consciousness in which conscious 
experience has no causal impact on human behavior is not capturing what we really care 
about. We generally think that we not only experience things, but that we react to those 
experiences, talk about them, and so on. But such reactions and speech acts are behaviors, 
which for now we are assuming are entirely described by the Core Theory. The passive-
mentalism notion of consciousness floats freely from all that, leaving no imprint on our 
actions in the world. Let us put aside these worries for the time being, and think more 
carefully about the physicalist alternative. 
 
Is Physicalism Conceivable? 
 
The zombie argument against physicalism gains leverage from the idea that zombies are 
conceivable. There is an obvious related question that garners less attention: is physicalism 
conceivable? By “physicalism” here I don’t simply mean a world with only physical 
properties, but specifically physicalism about consciousness. Can we conceive of a world 
where the ontology consists of nothing other than some notion of physical “stuff” (or the 
specific quantum fields in the Core Theory) without any inherently mental aspects, but 
which nevertheless accounts for consciousness as we experience it? 
 
Asking this question invites us to contemplate more carefully what a physicalist picture 
would entail, without necessarily going into the specific way in which actual human 
consciousness relates to functions in the brain. The basic idea is that of weak emergence. 
There exists a description of the system at a fine-grained level – in this case that of 
quantum field theory – that is complete and accurate on its own terms. And there is 
coarse-grained level of description, complete and more or less accurate on its own terms, 
which might involve entirely distinct ontological categories from those of the fine-
grained theory. But the descriptions are compatible, in the sense that there is a well-
defined map (typically many-to-one) from appropriate states in the fine-grained theory 
to those in the coarse-grained theory. In this picture, there is a set of processes undergone 
by certain states in the microphysical ontology, all of which correspond in the 
macroscopic description to “a person experiencing the redness of red.” 
 
Goff (2019) refers to the “brute identity theory,” according to which conscious states 
simply are states of the brain. This is not exactly how I would put it, and while the 
difference is slight it might be worth drawing out. It’s not that conscious states “are” 
states of the brain; it’s that certain states of the brain correspond to certain conscious states. 
This terminological nuance highlights the idea that there are multiple vocabularies we 
can use to describe the same underlying physical situation, each of which can stand on 
its own feet without reference to the others (we could profitably talk about conscious 
states before we knew anything about neurons or electrons), but which are compatible 
with each other in the sense that there are well-defined maps between them (even if the 
current state of human knowledge is unable to specify what those maps are). 
 
Emergent concepts, even in this weakly-emergent sense, capture something true and real; 
they are neither illusory nor arbitrary (Dennett 1991, Carroll 2016). Conscious states, in 
particular, describe real phenomena, and play causal and predictive roles in the world. If 
we are told “she was conscious of being watched,” we immediately have somewhat 
reliable expectations for how she will behave in response to future events. Subsequent 
identification of corresponding microstates in a more fine-grained description doesn’t 
affect the reality of the emergent concepts in an appropriate domain of applicability. And 
the recognition of these causal powers doesn’t imply that emergent concepts need to be 
accounted for by enriching the underlying ontology; rather, it counts strongly against any 
purported explanation that separates the concepts from their causal role.1 
 
1 Philosophers such as Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980) have used examples of weak emergence – for 
example the relationship between “water” and “H2O” – to argue for the existence of a posteriori necessities. 
The point I am making here is weaker, and independent of that discussion; simply that the concept of water 
plays a sensible role in a higher-level ontology whether or not we know that it corresponds to H2O at the 
microphysical level. 
 
If we grant that physicalist consciousness is conceivable, it follows that appropriate 
behavior of physical matter, without any specifically mental aspects, would amount to 
what we think of as “consciousness.” In that case, it follows that zombies are not 
conceivable after all, or at least they are not conceivable in a way that implies possibility. 
This point has been made in different ways in the literature; see Balog (1999, 2012), 
Frankish (2007), Brown (2010), and Campbell et al. (2017).  
 
When faced with a purported zombie – who acted in every way conscious, sincerely 
assured us that they had conscious experiences all the time, and behaved accordingly – 
someone who accepted the possibility of emergent physicalist consciousness would 
readily categorize such a creature as, in fact, conscious. (To that person, “consciousness” 
is a label we attach to such creatures, as a useful concept in our emergent ontology.) We 
could therefore run the following argument: 
 
• Physicalist consciousness is conceivable. 
• Conceivability implies possibility. 
• If physicalist consciousness is possible, zombies are impossible. 
• Therefore, zombies are impossible. 
 
Contrasting this with our previous zombie deduction, we see that the zombie argument 
is not by itself an argument against physicalism. It is a way of clarifying the idea that one 
will judge zombies to be conceivable if and only if one judges physicalist consciousness 
to be inconceivable. Neither argument is likely to have much persuasive power among 
people who are already satisfied with the other side. 
 
The zombie thought experiment should, if anything, push our credences more in the 
direction of physicalism. Given the existence of physically identical possible worlds with 
and without consciousness, an agent will reasonably want to know which world they 
find themselves in. The answer typically comes down to our first-person experiences, and 
the idea we can interrogate the reality of our own conscious experiences through 
introspection to decide that our experiences are real. But that’s just what a zombie would 
decide – at least, it’s what they would say they had decided, were we to ask them. Unless 
our thoughts are completely uncorrelated with what physically happens in our brains, 
the correct conclusion of the zombie scenario is that introspection about our conscious 
experiences is unreliable. But such introspection is the entire reason we felt the need to 
develop non-physicalist accounts of consciousness in the first place. In that sense, the 
zombie argument against physicalism is self-undermining. (For a contrary view see 
Chalmers 2003a.) 
 
The zombie scenario posits that we can conceive of persons who behave exactly as we do, 
but who lack inner experience. To pull off this trick, it is necessary to invoke strategies to 
completely sequester consciousness from anything that people say or do. The cost is that 
what ends up being described is not what we usually think of a person at all. Within a 
passive-mentalist approach, a person is not an integrated whole of phenomenal 
experience and behavior. Rather, they are effectively a zombie carrying around a sealed 
box labeled “mental stuff.” And their physical selves will never know what’s inside the 
box. Were they allowed to look inside and become aware of the mental aspects of their 
existence, the knowledge they gained would inevitably affect their behavior, which is 
against the rules. The fact that passive mentalism admits the conceivability of zombies 




The temptation to augment the ontology of the world with specifically mental aspects 
stems from a conviction that describing the mere behavior or function of matter cannot 
be sufficient to account for consciousness or innate nature. As characterized by Levine 
(1983), there seems to be an “explanatory gap” between physical states and conscious 
experiences. Physicalism posits that a conscious experience is an emergent phenomenon 
that arises in higher-level models of the same underlying processes described by physics. 
To a panpsychist, as Goff (2019) says about the brute identity theory, this “is very 
unsatisfying.” Arguably it is this “satisfaction gap,” more than any explanatory or 
ontological gap, that prompts the introduction of intrinsically mental concepts and 
categories into fundamental ontology. 
 
Any discussion of mental aspects of ontology must specify one of two alternatives: 
changing the known laws of physics, or positing that these aspects exert no causal 
influence over physical behavior. We cannot rule out the first option either through pure 
thought or by appeal to existing experimental data, but we can ask that any modification 
of the Core Theory be held to the same standards of rigor and specificity that physics 
itself is held to. The point of expressions like (1) and (3) is not that mentally-induced 
modifications of physical parameters are impossible, but that a promising theory of 
consciousness should be specific about how they are to be implemented. 
 
The passive mentalism option, where mental aspects have no impact on physical 
behavior, seems even less promising. “Behavior” should not be underrated; the behavior 
of physical matter is literally “what happens in the universe.” Crying at a funeral is 
behavior, as is asking someone to marry you, as is arguing about consciousness. No 
compelling account of consciousness can attribute a central explanatory role to 
metaphysical ingredients that have no influence on these kinds of behaviors. 
 
We don’t know everything there is to know about the laws of physics, and there is always 
the possibility of a surprise. But the solidity of our confidence in the Core Theory within 
its domain of applicability stands in stark contrast with our fuzzy grasp of the nature of 
consciousness. The most promising route to understanding consciousness is likely to 
involve further neuroscientific insights and a more refined philosophical understanding 
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